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ABSTRACT
This paper models the Federal Reserve's pursuit of
goals within the constraining forces of Congress, the
President, financial firms and the public. Two hypotheses
are empirically examined. Hypothesis 1 is that the
federal bUdget deficit is a determinant of Federal
Reserve "prof its," or U. S . Treasury deposits from the
Federal Reserve. Hypothesis 2 is that government spending
is significantly influenced by u. S. Treasury deposits
from the Federal Reserve. Empirical support of these
hypotheses suggests that the Federal Reserve is partially
responsible for changes in the federal bUdget deficit and
government spending.
INTRODUCTION
The Public Interest view argues that Federal Reserve
policy

is

solely

directed

toward

achieving

economic

stability. Policymakers are modeled as passive agents of
society

whose

prescriptions

only
of

dilemma

competing

is

how

economic

to

utilize

the

theories.

Policy

debates, for example, center on such issues as

whe~her

policymakers should favor discretion or rules of behavior
in their money supply policies. This view has come under

examination as economists have

elevated bureaucratic

incentives to appropriate sUbjects of inquiry. Partly due
to the poor predictive ability of the Public Interest
view, the Public Choice view has increasingly been used
to study government bureaus like the Federal Reserve.
Policy attributes of the Federal Reserve which do not
appear consistent with the Public Interest view include
its secrecy, large employment, churning of its open
market portfolio and its inflationary bias.
Public Choice views policy behavior as a function of
goals and the incentives, or constraints, for meeting
those goals and is analogous to modeling consumer
behavior as sUbject to constraints. Modeling Federal
Reserve behavior is difficult since, as Buchanan (1989)
argues, its only mandated goal is the responsibility to
"do good." Lack of specific mandates makes it difficult
to jUdge performance of the Federal Reserve and its
creator, Congress. Modeling is further complicated by a
complex network of constraints that include at least four
actors: the Congress, the President, the pUblic and
private banks. 1
This paper hypothesizes that Federal Reserve
payments to the U.S. Treasury, or "profits," are one of
the policy goals of the Federal Reserve. "Profits" are
the residual between its expenses and income and are
taxed at the rate of 100 percent. Even though the Federal
Reserve does not receive a bUdget appropriation from
Congress, this does not necessarily imply that its policy
is totally self-determined. Because "profits" generally
benefit politicians by reducing, dollar-far-dollar,
bUdget def icits, Federal Reserve policy may be partly
influenced by the desires of politicians. Two hypotheses
are examined. One, are "profits" influenced by the
financing needs of political sponsors? While textbooks
typically argue the case of political independence, this

view overlooks that the Federal Reserve is a creation of
politics (Congress) and its major players are nominated
by the President and approved by the Senate. TWo, because
the financing method that Congress imposes on the Federal
Reserve constitutes a 100 percent tax on "profits," do
increases in "profits" (taxes) lead to higher government
spending? Consistent with the views that hidden taxes are
preferred by politicians and that taxes cause spending,
"profits"

are

hypothesized

determinant of federal

to

be

spending.

a

significant

Confirmed hypotheses

would suggest that Federal Reserve policy is not only
dependent

on

politics,

but

sponsor-interest

in

high

"profits" may explain political
reluctance toward
heightened monitoring of its overall performance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
surveys

the

literature

with

emphasis

on

the

goals,

incentives and constraints on the Federal Reserve. After
discussing

the goals

and

incentives

associated

with

"profits," the two hypotheses are empirically examined.
Summary and policy conclusions close the paper.
CONSTRAINTS AND GOALS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Goals
The

Federal

Reserve

is

a

bureaucracy

since

it

regulates financial firms and the money supply within
existing laws. It is subject to mandated and personal
goals. Personal, or Niskanen's (1971) bureaucratic, goals
include salary, amenities, reputation, secrecy,
etc.,

and

any

satisfaction

over

improving

power,

economic

stability. Mandated goals are imposed by sponsors and
include price level stability,

low interest rates and

unemployment and come under the requirement "to do good."
Lack of mandated policy rules means that discretion is
used to promote "good" policy and allows, according to
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), it to respond to changes in
mandated goal priorities.

Congressional Constraints
Since 1947, the Federal Reserve has voluntarily
transferred its excess earnings, or "profits," to the
U.S. Treasury where they, dollar-far-dollar, reduce the
federal bUdget deficit. 2 It is often argued that the
reason why Congress placed the Federal Reserve outside of
its appropriations process is motivated by its desire to
make it independent of politics. However, there is no
requirement that it transfer "profits" to the U.S.
Treasury and, as Toma (1982) argues, previous episodes of
rising "profits" sparked congressional interest which the
Federal Reserve feared might be expressed in legislative
measures, such as mandating their particular disposition.
Partially in response to these fears, "profits" are
voluntarily transferred to the U.S. Treasury where they
are recorded as "miscellaneous receipts" in the revenue
side of the federal bUdget where they are no different
than any other tax and may be used to finance spending,
or reduce operating deficits. "profits", for FY 1989,
amounted to $19.6 billion, an amount approximately equal
to custom duties. 3
Another motivation for bUdgetary autonomy may be
suggested by the observation that these "profits"
represent sizable offsets to the federal bUdget deficit
and therefore there may exist sizeable political gains
from
bUdgetary independence. This view suggests that
political constraints on Federal Reserve behavior may
influence "profits" pOlicy and is consistent with
Buchanan and Wagner's (1977) argument that the Federal
Reserve responds to the financing needs of the federal
government. The churning of its Treasury portfolio is one
means by which it may enhance "profits." For example, the
Federal Reserve I s open market desk conducted gross market
purchases of $1,396,877 million in 1989; however, the net
change in the open market account was $16,070 million.

The difference between the two numbers is one measure of
churning. 4

By taking

portfolio,

it affects

capital

gains

"profits"

on

and,

its

extensive

in addition

to

Friedman's (1982) argument that churning may be related
to

promoting

a

sense

of

importance

to

its

staff,

enhancing the incomes of ex-officials (bond traders and
chief private economists who "read the tea leaves" behind
FOMe pOlicy)

and "muddying ll

the waters,

churning may

reflect a desire to affect U.S. budgetary affairs. This
may not

be

surprising

since,

and as Auerbach

(1990)

discusses, bUdgetary affairs are a perpetual theme in the
speeches and testimonies of Federal Reserve officials.
This discussion does not argue that the Federal
Reserve maximizes "profits." Rather, because it desires
to

consume

bureaucratic

goals,

it

may

appease

its

sponsors' desires in those areas that it has some control
over (e.g., inflation, interest rates, budget deficits).
In other words,

"profit" policy may affect the Federal

Reserve 's ability to consume personal bureaucratic goals.
Incentives

or

constraints

for

lower

deficits may be

conveyed as, for example, in return for larger "profits,
sponsors

agree

to

lower

monitoring

of

the

II

Federal

Reserve's attainment of bureaucratic goals. Therefore,
portfolio

churning

may

reflect

desires

to

budgetary affairs as well as the promotion

of

affect
broad

mandated goals related to economic stability.
other

related

arguments

have

been

forwarded.

Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that is unlikely that
central

bankers

will pursue

policy that

is

in

sharp

contrast to the people who nominated them. They predict
that

growing

external

demands

for

accommodation

of

growing budget deficits will result in an inflationary
policy bias. s Toma (1982) presents evidence in support of
the hypothesis that,

because "profits ll supplement the

government's

fund,

general

it

reduces

the

costs

of

fund-raising and therefore should expand public spending.
His evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve conducts
open market operations with an awareness of their wealth
transfer effect and that it personally benefits, via
higher spending, from inflationary monetary policy.
While Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913
and it can change its goals and constraints, past changes
have generally been in the direction of greater powers
and broader general responsibilities. For example, in
response to the Great Depression, Congress endowed the
Federal Reserve with more authority and power. 6 The
Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 increased the power and
autonomy of the Board relative to the Regional Banks and
the Treasury. The Acts also removed the Treasury
Secretary and the comptroller of the Currency from the
Board, increased the size of the Board, and lengthened
the terms of office of the Governors. The Board was also
given the authority to approve the chief operating
officers of each Regional Bank and, in its creation of
the FOMC, the Banking Act of 1935 achieved centralization
of open market operations.
Evidence indicates that congressional changes have
resulted in greater power-centralization at the Federal
Reserve.? The 1935 Banking Act centralized the power of
the FOMC with the Board in Washington, D.C. and
repositioned power away from Regional Banks to the
Board. 8 Growing centralization is consistent with studies
demonstrating that the Federal Reserve acts like a
monopoly. For example, Toma (1988) argues that reserve
requirements are "taxes" and a guarantee that banks
demand Federal Reserve output of base money. Toma
hypothesizes that when, prior to 1980, banks could choose
their regulator (state or federal), the Federal Reserve
would not choose monopolistic levels of reserve
requirements. Toma argues that when the Depository

Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (MCA)
of 1980 granted the Federal Reserve a monopoly in reserve
requirements,

reserve

requirements

because the MCA was passed,

rose.

in part,

Moreover,

in reaction to

declining Federal Reserve membership, the MeA enhanced
its monopoly powers. 9
Increased centralization as a predictor of monopoly
policy is also consistent with the "expense preference"
theory

of

argues

that,

Edwards

(1977).

when

firms

monitored by their owners

Expense preference
(bureaus)

are

(sponsors),

not

theory
closely

they will incur

expenses beyond profit-maximiz ing levels. This hypothesis
has been applied to bureaus like the Federal Reserve
because,

since it can not retain dollar profits,

it

consumes more bureaucratic goods such as salary, trips,
secrecy, etc. Finding a positive and significant relation
between the monetary base and Federal Reserve employment,
shughart and Tollison (1983) argue that base growth is
motivated,

in

part,

by

a

desire

to

expand

its

bureaucracy.lO Boyd (1984), strong (1984) and Allen et al
(1988) provide contrary evidence to this hypothesis while

Boyes

(1988)

and

Mounts

and

Sowell

(1990)

provide

confirming evidence.
Bureaucracy theory also predicts that bureaus have
an incentive to hide information from sponsors. Toma and
Toma

(1985)

Federal

Reserve

alternatives
useful

argue that,
to

by obscuring information,

reduces
the

current

sponsors'
monetary

knowledge
order.

the
of

without

information on alternatives to the control of

inflation and banking stability, secrecy increases the
demand for the Federal Reserve and lowers the quality of
political monitoring.

It is hypothesized that internal

research that positively favors alternative policy is
viewed as unproductive since it lowers the demand for
itself and may result in smaller bUdgets or increased

scrutiny. Toma and Toma note that the Federal Reserve
conducts pre-publication review of articles in its
reviews. 11 They also demonstrate that the bUdgets of 2
Regional Banks (st. Louis and Minneapolis) suffered
budgetary discipline when they favorably reported about
policies that the Federal Reserve was not currently
pursuing .12
Presidential Constraints
The U.S. President nominates and appoints, sUbject
to Senate confirmation, the Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board. SUbject to Senate confirmation, the
President also appoints the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Board of Governors. These appointments are important
since the Governors constitute a majority on the FOMC,
approve discount rate changes and may alter reserve
requirement ratios. 13 However, after their confirmation
and because of staggered terms, the conventional
textbook-view sees Presidential influence as relatively
unimportant. However, many of the above arguments
regarding Congressional influence may be relevant since
"profit" policies may benefit the President in much the
same way.
Kane (1980) argues that Congress and the President
benefit from the lack of mandated Federal Reserve goals
since this arrangement allows powerful special interests
to influence policy. Since powerful interest groups are
often adversely affected by rising interest rates, this
autonomy forces the Federal Reserve to be influenced by
special interests (the constituents of politicians) who
promote policies that lean against rising interest rates.
Lack of clearly-written mandated goals also may allow
pOliticians to claim the "high moral ground" when it
comes to rating monetary policy since politicians may
claim responsibility for "good" policy and blame the
Federal Reserve for "bad" policy -- an arrangement where
the Federal Reserve is a political scapegoat.

Another literature argues that the President usually
receives the monetary policy (money growth) of
choosing. Grier and Neiman (1987)
argue that
influence
related

of

to

the
the

budget
party

President in that
influences
money

deficit

on

affiliation

money growth
of

the

his
the

is

incumbent

the non-structural budget deficit
growth
only
under
Democratic

presidential administrations. Kane
(1980),
Woolley
(1984), Meiselman (1986) and Harvrilesky (1988) also
argue

that monetary

pOlicy is affected

by

incumbent

Presidents.
Private Bank Constraints
Wagner

(1986)

argues

that

Tullock I s

(1967)

rent-seeking hypothesis partially explains Federal
Reserve pOlicy and predicts that cartel-like arrangements
with banks will evolve over time. Rent-seeking predicts
that it is in the banks I

self-interests to engage in

activities that transfer wealth to themselves through tax
laws,

subsidies and legislation and views the Federal

Reserve as agent, or broker, for these services. skaggs
and Wasserkrug (1983) argue that, in pursuit of autonomy,
the Federal Reserve develops a constituency with banks as
a means of protecting itself from congress. Shughart
(1988)

argues

that

similar

arrangements

explain

the

emergence of the Glass-Steagall Act. 14
Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988) question the
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) theory that Federal Reserve
behavior during the Great Depression was based on
irrationality. They view the restrictive monetary policy
of 1929-33 as rational, self-interested behavior that
promoted a large differential failure rate between member
and nonmember banks.

Over 1930-33,

the

percentage of

suspensions that were members averaged only 20% (or 40%
of total deposits). These failures are argued to have
served two purposes. For members, it enhanced their

monopoly power and, for the Federal Reserve, it enhanced
its control over the banking system. 15
Havrilesky (1990) argues that, via the Federal
Advisory Council, the banking industry influences Federal
Reserve policy.
Private Market Constraints
The pUblic constrains the Federal Reserve through
their ability to elect members of Congress and the
President who, in turn, nominate and approve the
Governors of the Federal Reserve. To the extent that
voters are concerned about Federal Reserve policy,
elected representatives may signal to the Federal Reserve
the concerns of their constituents. For example, the
Banking committees of the House and Senate may constitute
one avenue whereby voters indirectly signal to the
Federal Reserve. This method is long-run since it is a
function
of
the
terms
of
office
of
elected
representatives and Federal Reserve officials and the
degree of useful information at the pUblic's disposal.
One pOlicy dilemma is that what the public monitors
is different from what the Federal Reserve can directly
control. The pUblic and pOliticians want "low" interest
rates, "fast" economic growth and price stability.
Acheson and Chant (1973) argue that several factors
explain central bank goals: the degree goals are
identified as goals of the central bank, the visibility
of attainment and priorities of sponsors. Failure to meet
visible goals increases the odds of examination, while
failure to meet less visible goals does not. One policy
dilemma is that the ability to achieve many of the
visible goals rests with money growth -- a statistic not
monitored as closely as interest rates or economic
growth. scrutiny then is placed on variables that lie
outside the direct control of the Federal Reserve and may
force it to meet multiple goals that are many times
incompatible in the short run and/or long run.

Randomness, or unpredictability, in money growth may
be one way the Federal Reserve meets conflicting goals
over time. 16 Moreover, if the Federal Reserve follows a
rational expectations view of the world, observed policy
randomness, or policy secrecy, may suggest that Federal
Reserve policy is aimed at stabilizing the economy. Such
randomness is consistent with Goodfriend's
(1986)
reporting that, in the course of a Freedom of Information
Act suit, the Federal Reserve argued that secrecy was an
important tool of monetary policy. Finally, policy
randomness may also be consistent with the attainment of
bureaucratic goals since, to the extent it fosters low
accountability, it may be consistent with Auerbach I s
(1990) emphasis on self-preservation as a policy goal.
AN EXAMINATION OF TWO HYPOTHESES
Political sponsors may benefit from "profits" since
higher "profits" reduce bUdget deficits. If the political
costs of financing government spending through "profits"
are relatively low, politicians may signal incentives to
the Federal Reserve in such ways as to promote large
"profits." If the bureaucratic goals of the Federal
Reserve
include
self-preservation,
autonomy
and
expense-preference behavior, the Federal Reserve may
appease political sponsors by producing "profits" policy
that minimizes the odds of adverse changes in its ability
to consume those bureaucratic goals. Such behavior may
afford the Federal Reserve the ability to further
bureaucratic goals as well as those mandated by sponsors
(budget deficits, macroeconomic stability, etc.)
Commercial bankers and bond traders may benefit from
large "profits" since, to the extent that policy involves
higher open market churning, rising "profits" may raise
the profitability of bond traders and increase their
value as Fed-watchers. If "profits" policy leads to lower
political scrutiny of Federal Reserve performance, such

pOlicy may also translate into lower scrutiny or
regulation of financial firms and bond traders. If the
pUblic is concerned over bUdget deficits, as reflected in
their influence over the timing of interest rate and
price level changes, they may also influence the ability
of the Federal Reserve to meet pOlicy goals relating to
interest rates and inflation. To the extent that rising
bUdget deficits affect its ability to meet interest-rate
and inflation goals,
"profits" may be partially
influenced by the deficit. 17
Two hypotheses stem from this discussion. The first
hypothesis is that the federal budget deficit is a
determinant of the size of Federal Reserve "profits."
That
is,
relatively
large
bUdget
deficits
are
hypothesized to be associated with relatively large
"profits." Hypothesis 1 is related to the reaction
function literature and specifically the issue of whether
or not the Federal Reserve monetizes federal budget
deficits. The issue is whether or not, in the face of
rising deficits and a goal of interest rate stability,
the Federal Reserve alters money growth. While Barro
(1977), Dwyer (1982) and Niskanen (1978) report that
money growth is not related to deficits, Levy (1981),
Laney and Willett (1983) and Grier and Neiman (1987)
report the opposite. Recently, Joines (1990) argues that
the current length of time series precludes our ability
to test this issue. This issue bears on hypothesis 1
since, to the extent that its open market activity is
responsive to rising deficits, a positive relationship
between "profits" and bUdget deficits may be guaranteed
since Federal Reserve revenues are primarily determined
by open market activity.
These complications, however, do not necessarily
suggest an alternative to hypothesis 1 since, in reaction
to rising deficits, open market operations may react in

several distinct manners. One manner is to expand its
open market account, on a net basis, in such a manner as
to alter money growth and inflation. Another manner is to
simply increase its gross portfolio churning without
permanently changing money growth. These two manners need
not raise "profits" since they may be consistent with
either capital gains or losses when the Federal Reserve
is attempting to stabilize interest rates. Another
possibility is that open market policy remains unchanged
in the face of rising deficits. Finally, even if rising
deficits bring higher revenues through the open market
desk, increased revenues may lead to higher consumption
of bureaucratic goals (as predicted by "expense
preference" theory) and therefore not lead to changes in
"profits." These complexities indicate that the "profit"
- deficit relationship is an empirical issue and that
testing of hypothesis 1 is preliminary or suggestive.
The second hypothesis is that public sector spending
is influenced by "profits." This hypothesis follows from
the fiscal illusion notion of Buchanan and Wagner (1977)
that predicts that government spending will be larger,
the greater taxes are hidden from taxpayers. In addition,
the tax-spend hypothesis of Friedman (1978) argues that
when taxes are raised, spe~ding increases follow. 18 Since
"profits" may be a well-hidden tax, it is hypothesized
that higher "profits" cause higher government spending.
Note that a positive "profits" - spending relationship is
not necessarily the result of conscious decision-making,
but rather may simply be a by-product of the incentives,
constraints and goals facing the Federal Reserve.
One important counter-hypothesis to the "fiscal
illusion" hypothesis of government spending is the
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. For example, Barro
(1977) argues that voters are not myopic about the costs
of different forms of government finance. Rather, this

hypothesis assumes that voters appropriately discount the
many different types of finance (taxes, deficits, loan
guarantees, etc.) when deciding on how much government to
vote for. Under this view, voters realize the taxes
associated with Federal Reserve "profits" and therefore
the ratio of government spending that is funded by
"profits" should not influence government spending.
Moreover, this view predicts that there is no fundamental
difference between the case where the Federal Reserve
pays "profits" to the Treasury and the case where it adds
them to its own surplus. In either case, this view would
predict that the financial position of th~ U.S.
government is the same.
There are various potential problems with this
counter-view of the influence of Federal Reserve
"prof its" on government spending. One issue is whether or
not the public actually properly discounts "profits" as
taxes that ultimately fund government spending, or reduce
budget def ic its. Another issue is whether or not Congress
would behave the same whether or not it directly receives
Federal Reserve "profits" or if those dollars remain as
Federal Reserve surplus. It is not clear how Congress
could spend Federal Reserve "profits II when they remain in
Federal Reserve surplus. However, when "profits II are
transferred to the Treasury, they may be immediately
spent, or used to lower the bUdget deficit.
Moreover, under present institutional arrangements,
the Federal Reserve is not an lion-budget" government
agency. While its "profits" (when sent to the Treasury)
show up on the government's balance sheet under payments,
or taxes, its spending does not show up on either side of
the government's balance sheet. Moreover, if the Federal
Reserve retains "profits" as surplus, changes in either
side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet will have no
effect on the balance sheet of the federal government.

Therefore, it would appear that the argument that it
doesn't matter, from a consolidated balance sheet
approach, whether the Federal Reserve retains "profits"
as surplus or sends them to the Treasury is not
particularly useful. In any event, these points remain
empirical issues and, if the Ricardian Equivalence
approach is correct, there should be no support for
Hypothesis 2.
Figure-l demonstrates the increasing importance of
"profits" to the overall financing efforts of the federal
government. As a percentage of federal revenues,
"profits" have risen from approximately .2 percent to 2
percent of federal revenues over 1947-89. Figure-2
eXhibits the contribution that "profits" have made to
lowering the federal budgot deficit. The "before" deficit
is measured as the bUdget deficit less "profits" and the
"after" deficit nets out the contribution from "profits."
casually, "profits" have grown with federal deficit
growth and, consistent with Figure-1, the contribution of
"profits" towards lowering the budget deficit has risen
during the 1980s.
Tests of Hypothesis 1
Testing of hypothesis 1 is performed by regressing
a time series of "profits" PROFIT on a constant and the
net federal budget deficit NETDEF, which is equal to the
federal budget deficit less "profits. ,,19 The deficit
NETDEF is measured on a net basis since it is
hypothesized that Federal Reserve policy is based on its
perception of the size of the budget deficit that would
prevail without any reduction from "profits." "Profits"
PROFIT is obtained from Office of Management and Budget
(1990) and represents Treasury "deposits of earnings from
the Federal Reserve System." The federal bUdget deficit
is obtained from council of Economic Advisors (1990) . The
choice of sample period is based on the fact that the

"Profits"
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1980

1985

PROFIT
series
commences
in 1947.
All data
are
first-differenced because most time series of level data
contain some time trend. All data are measured in $
billions.
Two alternative specifications are considered:
nominal and inflation-adjusted. The inflation-adjusted
specification uses the GNP deflator and controls for the
common element of inflation premiums in both federal
deficits and "profits." The following coefficients
(t-statistics)
nominal model:
PROFIT

were

=

estimated

over

1948-89

for

the

0.38 - 0.02 NETDEF
(3.16)
(3.67)

R2 = .23
s.e.e. = 0.77
DW = 1.47
F(2,40) = 13.48.
The statistically significant inverse relationship
between NETDEF and PROFIT is consistent with the
hypothesis that, when deficits are relatively high, they
lead to relatively large "profits." Note, that because
deficits are represented as negative numbers,
deficits
negative

larger

(negative numbers) will interact with the
coefficient to exert a positive effect on

Ilprofits." The coefficient on NETDEF is statistically
significant from zero at the .001 level (2-tailed test) .
Because casual inspections of Figure-1 and Figure-2
indicate that the size of "profits," relative to the
budget deficit, is much greater in the recent past,
several other sample periods are considered in order to
determine
whether
or
not
the
estimates
are
time-sensitive. The following periods are considered:
1965-89 and
1975-89.
For 1965-89,
the following
coefficients were estimated:
PROFIT

=

0.62 - 0.02 NETDEF
(3.31)
(2.84)
2
R = .23
s.e.e. = 0.92
DW = 1.66
F(2,23) = 8.07.
For 1975-89, the following coefficients were estimated:

PROFIT = 0.76 - 0.02 NETDEF
(2.64)
(2.60)
R2

= .29

s.e.e.

=

1.07

DW

= 1.43

F(2,13)

= 6.78.

These results suggest that the effect of NETDEF on PROFIT
is unchanged over the time period.
The

following

coefficients

(t-statistics)

were

estimated over 1948-89 for the inflation (GNP deflator)
adjusted model:
PROFIT

= 0.34
(2.40)

R2

=

.04

Based

on

s.e.e.
a

- 0.01 NETDEF
(1. 67)

= 0.90

two-tailed

OW = 2.09

test,

relationship between NETDEF

the

F(2,40)

estimated

and PROFIT

is

=

2.79.

inverse

0.103,

or

slightly below the commonly-used benchmark of .10. As in
the nominal specification, two other sample periods are
considered in order to determine whether or

not the

estimates are time-sensitive. For 1965-89, the following
coefficients were estimated:
PROFIT
R2

=

.03

=

0.47 - 0.01 NETDEF
(2.23)
(1.36)

s.e.e.

= 1.05

OW

= 1.92

F(2,23)

=

1.85.

For 1975-89, the following coefficients were estimated:
PROFIT

= 0.32
(1.14)

R2

=

While

.24
the

s.e.e.

=

- 0.02 NETDEF
(2.33)

1.08

estimations

OW
over

=

1.48

F(2,13)

1965-89

=

5.43.

indicate

no

statistical relationship between NETOEF and PROFIT, the
estimations

over

1975-89

indicate

a

statistically

significant and inverse relationship at the .036 level
(2-tailed

test) .

That

the

relationship

is

only

statistically significant in the later period may be
consistent with the casual evidence in Figure-1 that
indicates that "profits" exert a larger effect on the
bUdget deficit in the second half of the sample period.
Consistent with the previously-discussed

caveats

regarding the difficulty of modeling "profits" behavior,

these results provide some preliminary support for the
hypothesis that "profits" are influenced by the bUdget
deficit.
Tests of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 tests the following model of government
size:
SIZE = f(RATIO, DEC, GRANT, Y, POP)
where SIZE
(federal & nonfederal spending) / GNP
RATIO = Federal Reserve "profits" / federal
revenues
DEC = nonfederal spending/(federal &
nonfederal spending)
GRANT = grants / (federal & nonfederal spending)
Y = per capita real income ($1982)
POP = population
A similar model of government size is used in Oates
(1986) and Marlow (1988).20 RATIO measures the degree to
which federal revenues are composed of "profits. ,,21 The
expected sign on RATIO is positive following the argument
that relatively higher values of RATIO cause greater
fiscal illusion, and therefore government expenditure as
well.
DEC controls for fiscal decentralization and is
expected to exert an inverse effect on SIZE. The expected
sign on GRANT is positive following the argument that
intergovernmental grants are cartel-like devices that
expand monopoly power of government. Population POP
controls for demand changes and per capita real income Y
controls
for
Wagner's
Law,
or that
government
expenditures are income-elastic. All data are log
first-differenced and therefore represent growth rates
and, in response to data constraints, the estimations are
conducted over 1948-89. The regression coefficients
(2-tailed t-statistics) for the SIZE equation are given
below.

=

SIZE

0.72 DEC + 0.11 GRANT - 0.88 Y

0.02

(1. 06)

(6.76)

+ 0.98 POP

(3.48)

+ 0.05 RATIO

(0.86)
R2=

(1.69)

(4.59)

s . e . e.
. 028
DW = 1. 80
F( 6 , 36) = 21. 7 1
As hypothesized, RATIO exerts the hypothesized
positive effect and one that it is highly statistically
significant (.001 level). The coefficient on DEC is
statistically significant (.0001 level) and exerts the
hypothesized
inverse
effect
on
government
size.
Population growth is not found to exert a statistically
significant effect on SIZE. Per capita income growth
exerts a negative and statistically significant effect
(.027 level) on SIZE; a result that suggests that
government is an inferior good. The coefficient on GRANTS
exhibits
the
hypothesized
sign
and
is
weakly
• 72

statistically significant (.099 level).
In order to determine
sensitive to time,

if the above results

are

estimations are conducted over two

subsamples. In order to correct for serial correlation
over this time period, a first-order autoregressive term
SIZE(-l)

is

added

to

the

equation.

The

following

coefficients are estimated over 1965-89:
SIZE == 0.02
(1.11)

+

1.29 DEC + 0.07 GRANT - 0.39 Y
(4.33)
(1.22)
(1.48)

3.68 POP

(2.61)
s.e.e.

+ 0.10 RATIO + 0.75 SIZE(-l)
(3.80)
.020

(3.93)
DW=

1.74

F(7,18)

=

8.50

RATIO continues to exert a statistically significant
positive effect (.001 level) on SIZE. The coefficient on
DEC

remains

statistically

significant

and

negative.

Population growth is now found to exert a positive and
statistically significant (.02 level) influence on SIZE.
Per capita income growth no longer exerts a statistically

significant effect on SIZE and the coefficient on GRANTS
no longer exhibits statistical significance.
The following coefficients are estimated over 1975
89:
SIZE

= 0.02
(0.51)

0.76 DEC + 0.23 GRANT - 1.2~ Y
(1.26)
(1.25)
(1.56)

+ 0.55 POP + 0.11 RATIO + 0.66 SIZE(-l)
(0.20)

s.e.e.

(2.34)
.020

DW

(1.73)
1. 67

F(7,18)

=

21. 71

RATIO continues to exhibit the hypothesized positive
effect
though it is now of lower statistical
significance (.047 level, 2-tailed). The coefficient on
DEC is no longer statistically significant which suggest
that its influence on SIZE varies over 1948-89.
PopUlation growth is not found to exert a statistically
significant effect on SIZE - a result consistent with the
total time span of 1948-89, but not with the estimation
over ~965-89. Per capita income growth does not influence
SIZE which is consistent with the estimations over 1965
89, but inconsistent with the 1948-89 time period. GRANTS
is not found to influence SIZE - a result consistent with
the ~965-89 estimation which found no relation and the
~948-89 estimation which found a very weak influence. It
is noted that estimation over such a short period (~5
observations) may involve serious degrees-of-freedom
problems which may severely limit the usefulness of this
estimation.
In sum, the results tend to support hypothesis 2.
Estimations over 1948-89 and two sUbsamples indicate that
government spending is influenced by Federal Reserve
"profits. ,,22
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this paper suggest that the political
dependence of the Federal Reserve is an important
ingredient in our understanding of its policy. This view

does not predict that macroeconomic goals like price or
interest rate stability are absent from the Federal
Reserve's goal function; only that these goals do not
necessarily dominate policy. The constraints facing the
bureau are a determining factor of the degree to which
each goal is promoted and, in order for the Federal
Reserve to place emphasis on efforts aimed at stabilizing
the economy, it must operate under constraints that
promote that end. Other goals, such as bureaucratic or
the resolving of political problems related to budget
deficits may also be pursued and therefore affect pOlicy
behavior.
The evidence reported here suggests some support for
the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve I s "prof its"
policy reflects a desire to reduce federal budget
deficits. This hypothesis views such behavior as optimal
on the part of the Federal Reserve, given the constraints
imposed on the Federal Reserve by congress,
the
President, the banking community and the public.
"Profits" policy also appears to exert an independent
influence on government spending.
One implication is that the Federal Reserve is
responsible, to some degree, for changes in the budget
deficit. Because Congress set up the Federal Reserve with
the ability to raise taxes through "profits", its
activities can affect the size of the deficit through its
covert role in fiscal policy. Further research on the
extent to which open market churning is related to the
Federal Reserve I s concern for the bUdget def icit may
contribute to our understanding of the much-studied
randomness in money growth. That is, to what extent do
the many constraints on Federal Reserve policy contribute
to the randomness of money growth?
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FOOTNOTES
1. It may also be argued that the Federal Reserve is
sUbject to its own internal constraint, or "code of
conduct. "
2. See Toma (1982) and Congressional Budget Office (1985)
for greater detail on the financial constraints imposed
on the Federal Reserve.

3. Figure obtained from Office of Management and BUdget
(1990) .
4. See the
Bulletin.

December

1989

issue

of

Federal

Reserve

5. Buchanan and Wagner (1977, p.119) also argue that,
because the effects of its pOlicy actions are uncertain,
it will be relatively difficult for the Federal Reserve
to
resist
external pressures
on their
policies.
Relatively high uncertainty of policy outcomes is
consistent with Meltzer's (1987, p.ll) argument that our
predictive abilities are so unreliable that i t is
generally impossible to "distinguish consistently between
a boom and a recession either in the current quarter or
a year in advance."

6. See Toma (1982) and Congressional BUdget Office (1985)
for discussions of these changes.
7.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that growing
government centralization adversely affects government

performance. See Marlow (1988) and Joulfaian and Marlow
(1990)
which
test
the
hypothesis
that
greater
centralization allows governments to act more like
monopolists in their taxation and spending decisions.
8. Data reported in Shughart and Tollison (1983) also
indicates growing employment centralization of the
Federal
Reserve. That
is,
the
ratio
of
Board
employees-to-total employees of the Federal Reserve
system exhibits a positive trend and reflects a greater
power base in Washington, D.C.
9. Haslag and Hein (1989) dispute the argument that the
MCA has raised average reserve requirements of all
financial institutions.
10. After controlling for growth in various activities
(like check clearing), empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that bureaucratic incentives (employment)
drive the money supply process and contradict the
conventional view that increases in money result in more
employees for the purpose of handling larger numbers of
duties. Note, however, that Banaian et al (1988) argue
that, under the current institutional structure with the
100% tax, there is no behavioral reason to need to
increase revenues in order to increase expenses.
11. As partial support of this hypothesis, the authors
cite a
1979 Business Week article Which reports that
Chairman Arthur Burns instigated this policy.
12. Rolnick (1985) argues
suspect.

tha~

their empirical work is

13. See Federal Reserve Board (1984) for these duties.
14. Rather than wishing to promote banking safety t
Shughart argues that the Act promoted three other
interests: 1. brokerage firms eliminated competition from
banks in the investment banking marketj 2. bankers
eliminated competition from securities dealers in the
market for depos it taking j and 3. the U. S . Treasury
benefitted from the expansion of the market for its
securities.
15. Assuming that policy was based on the wishes of
congressmen serving on oversight committees ( the agents
of member banks in their states), they examined bank
failure rates across states and concluded that nonmember
failure rates were significantly higher in states with
representation on the House Banking and Currency
Committee.

1.6. Marlow (1990) argues that policy predictability
affects the degree to which the Federal Reserve can
control real GNP and inflation.
1.7. An unresolved issue is how important a component of
"prof its" is churning. For example, does it have more of
an effect on the timing of profits than on their total
magnitUde?
1.8.
See Manage and Marlow (1986)
and Marlow and
Orzechowski (1988) for theory and empirical evidence on
this hypothesis. Crain and Marlow (1990) provide evidence
that another "hidden" tax, Social Security contributions,
affects government spending in a similar manner.
1.9. While there exists, as discussed in Grier and Neiman
(1987), the issue of whether or not to cyclically adjust
budget deficits, this is not considered here.
20.
SIZE measures the expenditure-based size
of
government and follows the Marlow (1988) argument that,
when
governments run persistent bUdget deficits,
expenditure-based measures provide a better measure of
government I s resource absorption than those based on
revenues. Expenditure-based, or revenue-based, measures
of government size still fail to capture many other
government activities such as laws, regulations and
off-budget spending (see Marlow and Joulfaian 1989). All
units of government are measured in SIZE based on the
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) argument that empirical work
is misspecified When all competing governments are not
included in measures of government size. The estimated
relationship between RATIO and SIZE is not affected by
this
issue; i.e., when SIZE is measured without,
nonfederal spending, the estimated relationship did not
change.
An alternative measure of RATIO, "profits"/ (federal
did not alter the estimated
relationship.
21.

+ nonfederal revenues),

22. It is also noted that there may be a causality
problem here that may warrant further research in this
area.
If, holding taxes constant, an increase in
government size generates higher monetary expansion (and
hence higher "profits"), a larger RATIO may result.
Further research of this issue may wish to examine some
forms of causality tests.

